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Abstract 
During the post-socialist transition period, the Bulgarian irrigation facilities deteriorated to a 
large extent and no longer meet the needs of the new landowner and agricultural production 
structure. The Bulgarian government therefore enacted two new laws to encourage collective 
action and to establish water user associations in order to achieve sustainable water man-
agement. In this article, we will question the frequent argument that water user associations 
could easily be established in Bulgaria, because they are rooted in the water syndicates. 
 
Empirical findings from village case studies reveal that limited collective memory exists 
today about former water syndicates’ rules-in-use and patterns of action. We will explain 
this breach of tradition by the migration from villages to cities, the suppression of pre-
communist so-called capitalist behaviour, and the length of the communist period. More-
over, the analysis of the historical cooperative development in Bulgaria shows that the water 
syndicates were enforced by a top-down approach and did not have much in common with 
the classic cooperative principles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A closer look at the agricultural sector within Bulgaria shows an uneven distribution of natu-
ral water resources over time and space, making irrigation necessary to reduce production 
risk. The irrigation sector, until recently a major water user in Bulgaria, has been drastically 
affected by the political and economic changes that followed the collapse of the socialist 
system. The Bulgarian irrigation system was built to serve large production units during 
socialism and does not meet the needs of the new agricultural structure, which combines 
small-scale subsistence producers with medium and large-scale agricultural producers. At 
present, the facilities have largely deteriorated, and only a small percentage of the fields 
equipped with irrigation devices are actually irrigated (Petkov, 2000: 49). In the irrigation 
sector, we observed chaotic water appropriation rules and insecure and ineffective property 
rights.  
 
The Bulgarian government enacted two new laws -- the Bulgarian Water Law, implemented 
in January 2000, and the Water User Association Act, which came into force in March 2001. 
Both legal acts should encourage collective action and facilitate water user associations 
(WUAs) in an effort to achieve sustainable water management in agriculture. Their aim is to 
reform and decentralise the former centrally planned water sector and to increase the in-
volvement of local actors. Numerous World Bank projects, such as the “Irrigation Rehabili-
tation Project,” have attempted to set up WUAs since 1991 (World Bank, 1999).  
 
The introduction to the Water User Associations Act (2001) describes the motivation behind 
its creation. The act refers to similar organisational traditions by quoting the Law on Water 
Syndicates (WSs), which was in effect between 1920 and 1954. The World Bank likewise 
refers to Bulgaria’s irrigation tradition, including thirty years of WS’s activities (World 
Bank, 1999: 7; Annex 4). Experts interviewed in Sofia at the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forest (MAF) and at the offices of the World Bank corroborated the argument that WUAs 
can be established more easily in those regions where WSs existed before World War II. 
They use this tradition to justify their actions.  
 
The frequent argument that WUAs could easily be established because of their WSs history 
has neither been questioned nor empirically studied. Challenging research questions remain: 
Is it possible to tie into the tradition of WSs from before 1954 in order to successfully estab-
lish WUAs in present times? Does the local population remember the rules-in-use and action 
patterns that originated in the WSs -- i.e., did this knowledge outlast the socialist period?  
 
We will offer empirical evidence that the local population does not remember cooperative 
traditions of water management originating in the WSs. Moreover, we will show that the 
state’s immense intervention in water syndicates has hindered the emergence of those kinds 
of collective action principles that government authorities presently depend upon. 
 
In addition to explaining the basic definitions underlying this article, Section Two provides 
the context of the sociological debate: is it possible to tie into cooperative traditions from the 
pre-socialist period? The study’s analytical approach is presented afterwards. In Section 
Three we summarise the research methodology before Section Four reviews the historical 
cooperative development in Bulgaria in general and the development of the WSs in particu-
lar. Section Five presents the empirical case study. Empirical findings support the hypothe-
sis that only limited cooperative rules-in-use and action patterns of water management have 
outlasted the socialist period. We introduce possible reasons for this breach of tradition in 
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Section Six: the migration from villages to cities, the suppression of pre-communist so-
called capitalist behaviour, and the length of the communist period. Section Seven draws 
conclusions.  
 
2. UNDERSTANDING TRADITION 
The notion of tradition in this article refers to Elster (1991: 104), who defines tradition as 
“mindlessly repeating or imitating today what one’s ancestor did yesterday. The subject mat-
ter of tradition, thus understood, is how to build a house, when to sow and when to harvest, 
how to dress when going to church on Sunday and so on.” In line with this, tradition is un-
derstood as knowledge transfer between generations, in the sense of keeping the knowledge 
of rules and patterns of actions. In other words, keeping a “collective memory” of certain 
“rules-in-use” alive. 
 
According to Ostrom et al. (1994: 37-50), an institutional analysis relevant to field setting 
requires the understanding of the working rules, or rules-in-use, that individuals apply. Most 
formal analyses focus primarily on the structure of an action situation. Ostrom et al. indi-
cates this as the surface structure of formal representations. The rules are part of the underly-
ing structure. All rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order and pre-
dictability among humans. Rules-in-use govern the patterns of interaction among the differ-
ent actors in the system. They represent the set of rules to which participants would refer if 
asked to explain and justify their actions to fellow participants. 
 
Halbwachs (1985: 76) approaches “collective memory” as a picture of similarities of the 
same group of people. He stresses the importance of belonging to a group. A person is very 
much interested in a certain event. Nevertheless, he cannot remember anything. Even if oth-
ers explained the event to him, he would not be able to remember it. According to 
Halbwachs (1985: 8), this is possible because the person has left the group in which it had 
happened and whose members jointly remembered it. Moreover, in order to keep the collec-
tive memory, it is important to keep in contact with the group in which the person experi-
enced the event and to talk with the group about it. “I could not restore to life the memory, 
because I had nothing in common with my former companions for a long time” (Halbwachs, 
1985: 12). This is neither the fault of the group’s nor of an individual’s memory, but is due 
to the deletion of a broad collective memory (Halbwachs, 1985: 12; 99).  
 
Based on Halbwachs (1985: 66-71; 99), we will use tradition similar to collective memory. 
By combining this with Ostrom’s approach, however, we will limit ourselves to the remem-
brance of rules-in-use and pattern of behaviour. 
 
2.1  BREACH OR TRANSFER OF TRADITION– A SOCIOLOGICAL DEBATE 
We would like to place our research question within the context of the sociological debate 
that questions whether new institutional rules can be tied into traditions before 1944. The 
debate comprises many facets, which range between two views. I) There is a cooperative 
tradition from pre-socialist times in Bulgaria. New cooperative forms could easily be estab-
lished. II) It is problematic to ignore the history of the last 45 years and to set up institutions 
from the pre-socialist period. 
Advocates of the first view state that the rich pre-socialist cooperative tradition in Bulgaria 
promotes the revival of the present cooperative system (Todev et al., 1992: 144). Begg and 
Meurs (1998: 249, 266) argue that households are choosing cooperative forms today because 
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collective labour and collective land use is rooted in traditions that have spanned centuries. 
Up until 1944, Bulgaria’s economic structures were imprinted by a highly developed coop-
erative system. Todev et al. (1992: 144) assume that it is possible to build on these rich ex-
periences while establishing a market economy. According to Todev et al. (1992: 208), ex-
perts call for a revival of those structures that endured until the communist takeover. Simi-
larly, Weber et al. (1992) indicate the role of cooperatives in the transition period and the 
chance to tie into its tradition in Bulgaria. 
 
Todev et al. (1992: 220), however, qualify this simplistic argument in at least one point: 
“The true history of cooperatives in Bulgaria is absolutely unknown to present generations. 
It was falsified by the former communist regimes to such an extent that existing publications 
couldn’t be used for a current public relation campaign. Without such campaigns, it will not 
be possible to recollect the intellectual and historic roots of the Bulgarian cooperative 
movement.”  
 
Arguments in favour of the second view, which hark back to before the historical socialist 
period, are presented by Kanev (2002: 79), who analysed religion in Bulgaria after 1989 in 
the context of its own historical tradition. He describes the Bulgarian history as interrupted, 
characterised by a shortage of historical memory and a loss of established traditions. Brazda 
and Schediwy (2001: 40) also support the second view, as they see a problem in the transfer 
over generations. They refer to different authors and emphasise that “the cooperation model 
may be somewhat less stable than the market model or the hierarchy model, as it is based on 
a special type of collective enthusiasm that is hardly transferable over the generations.” 
 
Kostova and Giordano (1995: 102) and Giordano (1993: 9; 2001: 11) point out that people 
try to recreate the conditions of the pre-socialist era as if socialism never existed. Reforms 
would often refer to the glorious pre-socialist past, which is seen as decisive for the trans-
formation of the present and the design of future change. Giordano (1993: 8) uses a meta-
phor for illustration: “When one wishes to come out of a dead-end street, then one must re-
turn to the original point of entry.” According to Giordano (1993), the socialist period has so 
thoroughly altered the rural social structure and the consciousness of the people that the at-
tempt to recreate the conditions of 1946 can only be seen as illusory and fictitious. 
 
The authors (Kostova and Giordano, 1995; Giordano, 1993; Kaneff, 1998) take the example 
of the restoration of land ownership relations from 1946. Kaneff emphasises that tensions 
persist in the rural communities, although in 1997 approximately 64 percent had been re-
stored to the pre-communist owners1. Giordano (1993: 9; 2001: 12) calls this attempt to rec-
reate the conditions of 1946 a reprivatisation without farmers, which can be designed on 
paper but cannot be put into practice. The scholars stress that the socialist period formed 
certain perceptions and power structures that cannot be ignored while establishing new 
rules.2  
                                                 
1 See Swinnen (1997) for the reasons behind the local communities’ reluctance.  He explains the agricultural 
reform legislation, property rights restitution, and collective farm transformation policies after 1989 as the 
outcome of a political bargaining game between radical reformers and followers of the former communist 
party. 
2 The particular way in which privatisation has been carried out – that is, through the restitution of land to those 
who owned land in 1946 – emphasises the importance of kinship rather than work in defining rights over land 
ownership, which has led to the development of a whole range of tensions. An additional factor not to be 
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Creed (1998: 278) argues that socialism, including social relations, systematic interlinks in 
the economy, and cultural identities, created a distinctive historical context from which tran-
sition proceeds. Swain (1998: 5) gives a similar premise for his framework of the analysis of 
post-socialist rural change: current developments in the post-socialist countryside cannot be 
understood in isolation from the experience of the socialist past and the constraints it im-
posed.3 Also, Giordano and Kostova (2001: 17) conclude that innovative forms of coopera-
tives combining economic efficiency with democratic management are still unknown in 
Bulgaria. The traditional characteristics of collective decisions, collective action, and collec-
tive control are hard to find in modern-day Bulgaria (Kozhukharova 2001: 79).  
 
The sociological debate’s two views are described by Begg and Meurs (2001) as a) the 
“separatist” perspective, a disjunction from communism expressed in a history of change 
and b) the “organic” perspective, emphasising historical continuities and persistence. They 
present a third perspective c) where emerging institutions and behaviours are neither entirely 
artifacts of the new conditions nor pure continuities from the past. In their view, households 
draw on production traditions in order to form responses to changing conditions. 
2.2  ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
Two reasons were decisive in choosing the WSs as examples for a breach of tradition during 
socialism. First, the topic is of current interest, because of the recent development in the 
Bulgarian legislation. The Bulgarian Water Law, implemented in January 2000, and the Wa-
ter User Association Act, which came into force in March 2001, give highest priority to the 
establishment of WUAs. Second, WSs were not gradually restructured like the other agricul-
tural producer cooperatives after 1944. Instead, they were abruptly nationalized (see Section 
Four), thereby representing a special case in the history of the cooperative system in Bul-
garia.  
 
We will draw on the second strand of the sociological debate, which assumes limited 
chances to tie into a cooperative tradition from pre-socialist times. We will try to validate 
the hypothesis, that the tradition of the WSs did not outlast the socialist period.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The validation of the hypothesis is based on a review of documents in the Bulgarian Na-
tional Archive, at the Archive of the National Library, and at the library of the law faculty in 
Sofia. Legislation, legal interpretations, and documents from the Bulgarian National Archive 
from 1920 to 1965 were translated and analyzed. Some of these documents were not made 
public until the 1990s. Expert interviews at the MAF, the World Bank, and at the Irrigation 
System Company (ISC) were conducted in Sofia. 
 
Empirical material from four village case studies in the Pavel Bania region of central Bul-
garia contributed to this study. WSs were active in this region before and after World War 
                                                                                                                                                      
overlooked is the dramatic decline in living standards that has occurred across rural Bulgaria since 1989, as 
well as its implications for the popularity of collective farms (Kaneff, 1998: 165). 
3 Swain compared the transformation processes in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and introduced a 
point that should not be overseen, that is, that the collective farms profound social and cultural roles in vil-
lage life (Swain: 1993: 28). 
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II. These case studies were embedded in broader empirical fieldwork, which investigates 
possibilities for collective action in Bulgaria’s irrigation sector.4 
 
Qualitative research methods predominate these case studies (Yin, 1994: 1-17). To gain an 
overview and collect statistical data from the region, several interviews were carried out 
with experts at the regional level, such as at the ISC state firm and the District Agricultural 
Office. In the villages, the first interviewees were key persons such as the mayor, the man-
agers of the cooperative farms, tenants, or the water guard, who were questioned according 
to an interview guideline. As a second step, farmers were selected by random sampling and 
questioned with informal open-ended interviews to verify the information obtained. In addi-
tion to observation and interviews, emphasis was placed on the inclusion of participatory 
research methods, the most fruitful of which were map drawings and group discussions with 
farmers. 
 
4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVES AND WATER SYNDICATES  
The following section explains the history of the cooperative system in Bulgaria, in general, 
and the development of the WSs, in particular.  
 
The Bulgarian cooperative movement went through many stages. The notion “cooperative” 
was used in different contexts, sometimes with a political purpose, therefore it must be con-
sidered with great care. Brazda and Schediwy (2001: 36) differentiate between “real coop-
eratives” and “lifeless cooperatives.” In this article, the term “classic cooperative” is used, 
instead of real cooperatives. Classic cooperatives are managed and operated according to the 
cooperative principles set up by Hermann Schlulze-Delitzsch and Friedrich Wilhelm Raif-
feisen, who created the modern cooperative system in Germany.5 The term “pseudo-
cooperative” is used for what Brazda and Schediwy call “lifeless.” It stands for the centrally 
administrated, hierarchically managed, nationalised cooperative system that is no longer 
active according to the cooperative principles of the classic cooperatives. The socialist col-
lective enterprises belong to these pseudo-cooperatives. 
4.1  PRE-PERIOD OF COOPERATION 
This period lasted from the first settlement of people on the Bulgarian territory until the 
Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878). The beginnings of cooperative groupings on Bulgarian 
soil can be traced back to the Thracian tribes. The organisational structure was the clan, 
which provided protection and security to its clan members. Similar formations with only 
minor changes could be found later, during the settlement of the East-Slaves and Bulgarian 
ancestors on the Bulgarian territory (Popov, 1924: 1-2; Sapundziev, 1947: 48-52). With the 
gradual disbandment of the clans, new forms of collaboration developed -- household com-
                                                 
4 The process of institutional change in Bulgaria’s irrigation sector can best be analysed with a dynamic re-
search methodology. The complete study is therefore based on six months of empirical fieldwork, subdivided 
into three phases over a period of two and a half years. The authors conducted 18 village case studies in three 
regions of Bulgaria.  
5 The guiding principles of the cooperative concept are: 1) the advancement mandate, i.e., the advancement of 
its members’ economic development, 2) the identity principle, i.e., those willing to cooperate should establish 
and maintain a jointly owned and operated enterprise on the basis of self-help, and 3) the democratic proce-
dure principle, i.e., a decentralised structure of self-reliant units with entirely voluntary entry and exit (Asch-
hoff and Henningsen, 1996: 16-25; 141-147). 
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munities (zadruga6) in the plains and harvesting cooperatives (Zetvaska tscheta) in the hilly 
regions. The first trade associations had already emerged in Bulgaria by the tenth century. 
Simultaneously, the guilds (esnafski sdruzenija) appeared (Boevsky, 1997: 263). The de-
scribed period formed a fruitful basis for the further development of cooperatives in the pe-
riod following.7 
4.2  PRIME PERIOD OF COOPERATION 
This period commences at the end of the Russian-Turkish war in 1878, an event that marked 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire (1396-1878), and finishes in 1945. Attempts to form agricul-
tural cooperatives in Bulgaria date back to the turn of the nineteenth century. “Oralo,” the 
first cooperative not only in Bulgaria but in the Balkans as well, was founded in 1890 under 
the Raiffeisen principles (Zentralverband der Konsumgenossenschaften, 1986: 85-87). 
Nonetheless, the first rise of cooperatives was delayed until the passing of a cooperative law 
in 1907 (Palasov: 1946: 317). The rapid development of the cooperative system was due to 
the country’s land ownership structure. Bulgaria was dominated at the time by small land-
owners (Todev et al., 1994: 31). An remarkable development in the cooperative system oc-
curred during the period of the peasant party government (1919-1923), which represents a 
peak in the development of the cooperative system in Bulgaria (Todev, 1992: 168).8 In 1921 
there were 870 cooperatives, and in 1923 the number increased to 1,423 (Madrow, 1938: 
564). By 1939 there were 3,502 cooperatives in the country. A sign of this prime period was 
that the rural intelligentsia -- including teachers, priests and clerks -- were substantially rep-
resented among the cooperatives’ members, sometimes working as bookkeepers or agrono-
mists in the cooperatives (Kozhucharova and Rangelova, 2001: 22).  
 
Even after the Russian-Turkish war, legal decisions in Bulgaria were influenced by the Ot-
toman legislation. First steps to regulate water use were taken in 1882 with the Law on Re-
gional and Local Administration (Michaelvo, 1935: 52). In 1897 a law that regulated public 
goods, including water use, was enforced. Thereafter, a law on estate and property was 
adopted from Spanish and Italian civil law that regulated the ownership of water.  
 
Eventually, in 1920, the Bulgarian parliament passed the Law on Water Syndicates, which 
was based on the Prussian water law from 1913. One of the objectives was to regulate water 
use according to cooperative principles because the state lacked the financial means to man-
age it on its own. The law supported the establishment of WSs under cooperative principles, 
but the self-administration of the syndicates was limited. The public interest and state poli-
cies had priority (Milenkov, 1943). For example, the law required the approval of a minister 
in order to found a WS, because the WSs’ measures had to serve the public interest or con-
tribute to public economic utility (Michaelov, 1935: 68; Law of Water Syndicates, 1920: § 
8). In other words, the right of free choice of membership was violated. Some of the estab-
lished syndicates had compulsory membership (Michov, 1986: 410), which was justified in 
their definition as cooperatives yielding a benefit for all landowners upon establishment. 
                                                 
6 The zadruga was a patriarchal system of joint farming, in which all property was commonly owned by ex-
tended families, and labour was performed collectively (Begg and Meurs, 1998: 268). 
7 For historical details about the cooperative movement in Bulgaria, from the first settlement until recent times, 
see Boevsky (1997). 
8 Among scientists a discussion came up on whether these cooperatives were initiated and enforced by the 
government. This argument leads to the theory that these cooperatives were not classic cooperatives, and that 
the period could not be called a prime period in the sense of the classical cooperative principles. This argu-
ment is not followed within the scope of this article. 
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Compulsory membership applied even to those landowners who did not benefit from the 
activities of the WS, but their membership simplifies the WS’s activities. If those compul-
sory members bore disadvantages, they should be compensated according to the law 
(Michaelov, 1935: 63; Law on Water Syndicates, 1920: § 42).  
 
Three categories of water syndicates were established and all were named water syndicates 
(WSs): 1) syndicates for irrigation, 2) syndicates for correction of rivers and drainage, and 
3) syndicates for electricity. On 25 November 1921, “Strascha” -- the first WS for irrigation 
-- was established in the village of Boschula, located in the Pasaschik district. Seven WSs 
for irrigation were founded in 1921, eight in 1922, and an additional five in 1923 (Michov, 
1986: 414). By 1928 the total number of WSs of the first category amounted to 27. In 1933 
the statistics reported 31 WSs for irrigation, which included 11,545 natural persons and 80 
legal entities as members (Michov, 1990: 71, 188). 
4.3  SOCIALIST PERIOD - BREACH OF TRADITION 
The socialist period (1945–1989) can be considered a “breach of tradition.” Socialist reor-
ganization of the producer cooperative was initially supposed to be on a voluntary basis, but 
was actually accomplished under coercion (Todev et al., 1994: 31). Both incentives and co-
ercion were used. After Zhivkov became the communist party’s secretary general, forced 
collectivization was pushed once more and finalized in 1958 (Todev et al., 1992: 177; Todev 
and Brazda, 1994: 32). The complete triumph of the “cooperative system in agriculture” was 
officially declared in 1958. Later, in the 1970s, a further process of centralization took place 
with the establishment of the Agricultural Industrial Complexes (Todev and Brazda, 1994: 
33). Despite the regime change in 1944, statistics show an increase in the number of local 
cooperatives -- from 4,114 in 1944 to 6,160 in 1947.9 This was due to information and pub-
lic relation work on the part of communist leaders, who pushed the concept of cooperatives. 
Essential for classic cooperative systems is the integrated corporate structure of local coop-
eratives and regional and national cooperative associations. By 1948, however, the number 
of national cooperative associations had dropped to one, a good indicator of the onset of an 
era of pseudo-cooperatives.10 Here we can observe one consequence of the 1948 law on co-
operatives, which marked the beginning of the nationalisation and top-down management of 
cooperatives. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a model of thought on the relevance of the classic cooperative system in 
Bulgaria. Due to the important distinction between classic and pseudo-cooperatives, the 
scale of this development cannot be measured by membership development alone. The rele-
vance of a movement in society includes the support of an idea, which is difficult to measure 
in proxy variables. Therefore, Figure 1 does not depict a graph with absolute or quantitative 
numbers. Instead, the relevance of the development is set in relation to historical stages. 
                                                 
9 The number of local cooperatives totalled 4,114 in 1944; 5,078 in 1945; and 6,160 in 1946. The number of 
regional cooperative associations was 53 in 1944; 62 in 1945; 65 in 1946; and 85 in 1947. (National Statisti-
cal Institute, 1947-1948: 207) 
10 The number of central cooperative associations totalled 19 in 1944, 19 in 1945, 20 in 1946, six in 1947, and 
one in 1948. (National Statistical Institute, 1947-1948: 207) 
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 Development pathway of cooperative development 
 Transformation of “classic” cooperative into “pseudo-”cooperative 
 
Figure 1: Development of the Cooperative System I 
 
By 1947, a total of 67 WSs existed in Bulgaria. On 20 February 1947, the Association of 
WSs was founded. The goal of this umbrella organization was to support and coordinate all 
actions of the compulsory member WSs (Bulgarian National Archive, 1962: Historical Re-
port of Fond 167, 1947-1952). 
 
Since 1947, the Ministry of Agriculture has had diverse regulations that have exerted influ-
ence on the activities of the WSs. The impact of these regulations on the WSs’ decision-
making has increased over the years. Documents from 1950 reveal various levels of secrecy 
with regard to WS activities. For example, the annual balance sheet and the irrigation struc-
ture development plan were classified as “top secret” (Bulgarian National Archive, 1950: 
Fond 167, record number: 1 record unit 692, sheet 1, 2). In 1953 employees were spied upon 
and turned in if they offended the rules of secrecy (Bulgarian National Archive: Fond 349, 
record number: 1, record unit: 9, sheet 1, 2).  
 
In 1951 the Association of WSs lost its independence when it became affiliated with the 
ministry. Moreover, close collaboration with the communist party was defined as one of the 
goal of the association (Bulgarian National Archive, 1951: Fond 167, record number: 1, re-
cord unit 7, sheet 1-4). 
 
Thereafter, the association of WSs was liquidated according to the Decree No. 11 of the 
Council of Ministers from 10 January 1953. The Directorate for State Drainage and Irriga-
tion Systems at the Ministry of Agriculture was founded. The WSs’ assets were transferred 
to this new directorate. In the years 1954 and 1955, individual WSs were liquidated and 
thereby abruptly nationalised (Bulgarian National Archive, 1962: Historical Report of Fond 
167, 1947-1952).  
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The irrigation systems have been financed by the state since 1955. Several of the Ministry’s 
reorganisation of its directorates increased the process of centralisation. According to Regu-
lation No. 168 of the Council of Ministers from 1962, a Directorate of Water Management 
was implemented at the Ministry of Agriculture. With the Decree No. 562 coming into force 
in December 1962, the Directorate was no longer working under the ministry, but instead 
was directly affiliated with the Council of Ministers (Bulgarian National Archive: Historical 
Report of Fond 349).  
 
5. CASE STUDY – WATER SYNDICATES IN PAVEL BANIA REGION 
Recent trends in Bulgaria’s legislation and development aid activities have shown that po-
litical decision-makers and international donor organizations expect an awareness of coop-
eration mechanisms and patterns of collective action among the local population which are 
rooted in the WSs’ history. As mentioned above, we oppose this assumption and argue that 
tying into a cooperative tradition from pre-socialist times is restricted. Based on the follow-
ing empirical case study material, we will validate our hypothesis that the tradition of WSs 
did not outlast the socialist period.  
5.1  RESEARCH SITE 
The Pavel Bania commune belongs to the District Stora Zagora, and the state firm ISC’s 
Stora Zagora branch is responsible for its irrigation affairs. WSs in this region were active 
before and after World War II.11 Pavel Bania is situated in a valley between the Stara Plan-
ina and the Sredna Gora mountain ranges. Excluding grazing land, the agricultural area in 
the Pavel Bania commune amounts to 9,300 hectares, two-thirds of which were under culti-
vation in 2001. The excellent water supply from natural resources is rare. Several mountain 
rivulets and rivers flow through the valley. Moreover, the groundwater level in some areas is 
at two meters and could easily be used for irrigation. Nevertheless, the existing water man-
agement problems are striking. The fact that problems in the irrigation sector are not related 
to natural water shortage makes this region unique. Their problems concern distribution, 
appropriation, and responsibility.12 Experts believe that soil structure and rainfall distribu-
tion only allow for grain to be cultivated without irrigation. Irrigation, however, is inevitable 
for perennials, such as mint and roses.13 Their yields will decline to 50 percent if crops are 
not irrigated.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the irrigation catchment area of the Pavel Bania commune. The rivers 
rise in the two mountains enclosing the commune, pass through the valley, and fill the Ko-
prinka water dam. Villages with WSs are indicated by the symbol ! in Figure 2. Pavel Bania 
commune’s irrigation infrastructure presently comprises a complicated network of thirteen 
micro-dams, pumping stations, weirs, and canal systems built for the most part by collective 
farms during the socialist era. The WSs already constructed the basic network of irrigation 
canals before World War II, as indicated in Figure 2.  
                                                 
11 The following examples of WSs are described in the literature: “Slatna Reka” Water Syndicate in Stora 
Zagora covers an irrigation area of 1,200 hectares. “Reiska Reka” Water Syndicate in Bogomilovo in the 
Stora Zagora region covers an irrigation area of 1,700 hectares. (Michaelov, 1935:152, 158) 
12 For a more in-depth analysis on water appropriation conflicts, see Theesfeld (2000). 
13 Pavel Banja commune is located 25 kilometres west of the city Kasanlak. Its “Valley of Roses” has been 
cultivating roses for four hundred years. About 80 percent of the world’s production of attar of roses is lo-
cated here.  
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The Pavel Bania commune comprises twelve villages and the municipality Pavel Bania. 
WSs existed in six out of twelve villages. Under these premises, the town of Pavel Bania 
and three of the villages that formerly housed WSs were chosen for case study analyses: 
Alexandrovo, Gabarevo, and Taza (Figure 2). 
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 Village ! Village with a water syndicate 
 River  Irrigation canal constructed from a water syndicate 
 Transportation canal M1 and M2  Water dam (Koprinka water dam) 
 
Figure 2: Irrigation Catchment Area - Pavel Bania Commune 
Source: Developed from local maps, mind mappings, information from the state firm ISC’s Stora Zagora 
branch. 
5.2  EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW 
It turned out to be very difficult to find people in the four villages with knowledge about WS 
performance. Some villagers could confirm their existence but did not remember any details. 
There are diverse opinions on the origin, purpose, and activities of the WSs. We will illus-
trate this with some statements to support this interpretation. 
 
In the village of Taza, the otherwise knowledgeable mayor and the son of the village eldest 
did not know anything about the previous existence of a WS, although an expert for the irri-
gation systems in Stora Zagora stated that one existed.  
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In the village of Gabarevo, a 77-year-old man was able to give some details but emphasised 
that the knowledge of WS rules and organisational structure is very limited among the local 
population.  
 
The favourable natural conditions for water are well known by the local population and are 
expressed by the proverb: “He walks with his feet in the water, but he is always thirsty.” In 
other words, those possessing enough water do not value it and the organisation of its man-
agement becomes more difficult. This proverb’s use emphasises that the knowledge of rules 
for water resource organisation and management that existed with the WSs are no longer 
alive among the local population. The expression “everyone is waiting for somebody else - 
or the mayor - to do something” exemplifies the lack of motivation to cooperate. 
 
The following statement illustrates the perceptions of the heritage of the WS during social-
ism. An interviewee in Gabarevo explained that WS canals were not used or extended dur-
ing the communist era. “Instead new, unreasonable canals were built.”  
 
During a number of informal interviews, it was expressed that pre-communist so-called 
capitalist behaviour or recounting those times was suppressed: “Talking about the WSs was 
forbidden for a long time.” Moreover, villagers reported that several people suffered greatly 
under the communist regime; they were imprisoned or their relatives killed. 
 
6.  EXPLAINING THE BREACH OF TRADITION 
We believe that it is problematic to tie into the tradition of pre-1954 WSs in order to estab-
lish WUAs today. The empirical findings (Section Five) verify the hypothesis that the WS 
tradition did not outlast the socialist period. With reference to the case study material, there 
is little commonly held information about water appropriation rules, water fee collection 
rules, or sanctioning mechanisms. Knowledge about their existence and rules-in-use is too 
uncommon to be a significant variable in determining the establishment of water user asso-
ciations in the present day and age.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates that the ideas and opportunities for a cooperative movement have 
changed following a breach of tradition during socialism. Development pathway (a) repre-
sents the view that there is an unchanged line of tradition and that it is unproblematic to tie 
into pre-socialist traditions. Pathway (b) supports the view that local people have limited 
knowledge of the classic cooperative tradition. In addition, their feelings and views may 
have changed during the communist era, and it is not easy to tie into traditions from the past 
while ignoring recent history. 
THEESFELD AND BOEVSKY – A Breach of Tradition during Socialism – The Case of Water Syndicates in Bulgaria 
 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper No. 17 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Development pathway of the cooperative development 
 Development pathway with minimal impact on the socialist period  
 Classic cooperative development after the breach of tradition with restricted and changed 
tradition transfer 
Figure 3: Development of the Cooperative System II  
 
What are the impediments in tying into collective action from the pre-socialist era? To ana-
lyze this, we classified the material on cooperative development and the tradition transfer 
during and after socialism in Bulgaria. We derived three explanatory variables for the breach 
of tradition: a) the migration from villages to cities, b) the suppression of pre-communist so-
called capitalist behavior or recounting those times, and c) the length of the communist era. 
The crucial point found in all three arguments is the interruption of communication. 
6.1  MIGRATION FROM VILLAGES TO CITIES 
At the end of World War II, 80 percent of Bulgarian citizens lived in the countryside and in 
extended families. During the 1970s and 1980s, a large transfer of labor from agricultural to 
nonagricultural sectors took place as a result of continuing industrialization. The strongest 
wave of collectivization occurred between 1955 and 1958 (Jivkova, 1994: 12-14). Migration 
from village to town was significant at that time and was the result of land collectivization 
combined with the state’s priority to invest in the industrial sector (Giordano and Kostova, 
2001: 8; Begg and Meurs, 1998: 248). Private farmers were forced to give their land to the 
collectives. Larger land plots and mechanization required fewer workers. Industrial centers 
attracted the village population, mainly the youth, which led to a de-population of villages 
and imbalances in the rural age structure (Kozhucharova and Rangelova, 2001: 29). Jivkova 
(1994: 12) analyzed factors leading up to this migration and even revealed a crisis in vil-
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lages’ demographic development, which destroyed the rural population’s traditional way of 
life. With the onset of compulsory collectivization, the rural population decreased from 70 
percent of the country’s total in the 1940s to 30 percent in the 1980s (Kaneef: 1998: 163; 
Kostova and Giordano, 1995: 102).  
 
The political and ideological purpose was to drive a wedge between the generations. The 
migration destroyed the extended families as household unit. As Halbwachs put it (1985), 
there was no longer a group that functioned as a keeper of remembrance. Many former land-
owners are pensioners today, and their children have grown up in the cities, unwilling to 
return to the countryside (Todev, 1992: 211). Kozhucharova and Rangelova (2001: 36) em-
phasize that, even after 1989, urbanised rurality is considered as a mark of progress, whereas 
traditionalism is a sign of backwardness.  
6.2  SUPPRESSION OF PRECOMMUNIST CAPITALIST BEHAVIOR  
During the socialist era, only limited knowledge transfer from the old to the young was pos-
sible. Political leaders interpreted the adherence to old lifestyles, as with those from pre-
communist times, as supporting capitalism (Jivkova, 1993; 1994). The communist strategy 
was to erase any kind of so-called capitalistic behaviour that could be analysed in the com-
munist ideology. Moreover, the communists did not stop at the systematic destruction of the 
true past. For instance, after the 1946 agrarian reform, Bulgarian leaders -- especially the 
local communist authorities -- destroyed land records during the course of collectivisation. 
Such destruction of the records of everyday life symbolised the ease with which the unac-
ceptable past could be eliminated (Giordano, 1993: 7). It was similarly replaced by a how-it-
should-have-occurred reconstruction of history. The rewriting of history in the sense of ideo-
logical correctness was a common means of communist propaganda (Kuran, 1997: 249).14  
 
As shown in the empirical material, thought that differed from the socialist doctrine was 
denounced as faulty consciousness. A huge propaganda machine was developed to dissemi-
nate the ideologically correct position for every “fact” imaginable (Kuran, 1997: 249f.). The 
communists used the fear of death or harm to relatives as a strategy for keeping people si-
lent.15  
 
Kozhukharova (2001: 73ff.) reveals the increasing diminishment of rural initiative -- once 
decisive in promoting institutions such as the village school, the cooperative, or the village 
cultural club -- under conditions of central planning, which regulated rural life from the out-
side in the form of national programs. Kozhukharova (2001: 75) deplores the resulting pas-
sivity. The village community leaders have always relied on the state, expecting solutions to 
their local problems and even now are waiting for the state to become stable before they do 
something for their village. 
6.3  LENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PERIOD 
The communist era lasted 44 years; in other words, the collective farms were a fact of (rural) 
life for over forty years. This period comprises more than one generation. Nowadays, there 
is limited overlapping of knowledge keepers and those people supposed to start the new 
forms of institutional arrangements. Swain (1993: 22) argues that the generation opposed to 
collectivisation is now either retired or has abandoned agriculture long ago. Most of the WSs 
                                                 
14 An example is Zivhov’s era, when the invention of Bulgarian folk culture of a mono-ethnic nature was not 
doubt closely connected with the policy to expulse the Turkish minority (Giordano, 1993: 8). 
15 Pressure exerted by the regime is described in Todev (1994: 47) and Kuran (1997: 140-151, 247-267). 
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were founded between 1920 and 1935, with the youngest founders between twenty and 
thirty years old. These founders were about 85 years old as communism came to an end in 
1989. Based on an average life expectancy of 67 years for men (National Statistical Institute, 
1963: 66; 1992: 22; 2000: 48), it can be concluded that most of these knowledge keepers are 
no longer alive.  
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that the local population does not remember cooperative traditions of water 
management that originate in the Bulgarian WSs before World War II. Its rules-in-use and 
action patterns did not outlast the socialist period. This is due to a breach of tradition during 
socialism facilitated by a) the migration from villages to cities, b) the suppression of pre-
communist so-called capitalist behavior and c) the length of the communist era.  
 
The analysis of the historical development of WSs reveals additional constraints for tying 
into cooperative traditions in water management of pre-socialist times. It becomes evident 
that the WSs were not classic cooperatives, as they had little in common with their princi-
ples. It is almost impossible to develop a collective memory of self-help and collective ac-
tion principles, because there has never been a history of a bottom-up approach. People have 
not developed an increased awareness of the WSs due to their top-down implementation and 
their abrupt liquidation. For this reason, these pseudo-cooperatives do not represent collec-
tive action examples for the establishment of WUAs. The influence of the state and the 
communist party on the WS association was observable when, in 1951, the association of 
WSs lost its independence and became affiliated to the ministry. With this in mind, one must 
ask whether the WSs resemble a myth, which government officials and donor agencies use 
to justify their actions. Hence, the state’s role in Bulgaria’s WSs should be investigated in 
further sociological and historical research.  
 
To summarise, the existence of former WSs does not facilitate the establishment of WUAs 
in present times. Instead, the “limited influence of tradition” is a transformation-specific 
feature that has to be taken into account when analysing transformation processes. 
 
Nevertheless, a persistence of traditions is possible for other subjects. Further sociological, 
empirical work could shed light on the questions: How were other traditions or mentalities 
adopted? What kinds of new forms were developed during the socialist period? And finally, 
which traditions persist? 
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